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“The fact that we disapprove of the government of a particular
country ought not to inhibit our dialog with the people who suffer
under those governments.... We are strongest and most influential
when we embody the freedoms to which others aspire.”1— Rep.
Howard L. Berman
INTRODUCTION
Social media and other digital technologies play a crucial role in
assisting ordinary citizens to speak up and organize themselves
against repressive governments.2 One of the principal catalysts of
the Arab Spring,3 for example, has been social media’s “power to put
a human face on political oppression ... [through] stories told and
retold on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in ways that inspire[ ]
dissidents to organize protests, criticize their governments, and
spread ideas about democracy.”4 Social media helps to obviate
collective action problems by enabling “a combination of real-time
and group coordination that helps tip the balance” away from
governments in favor of citizen activists.5 There is perhaps no better
confirmation of social media’s usefulness to popular dissent than the
decisions by Egyptian, Syrian, Chinese, and Libyan leaders to shut
1. 138 CONG. REC. 15,052 (1992).
2. See, e.g., PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., PROJECT ON INFO. TECH. & POLITICAL ISLAM,
OPENING CLOSED REGIMES: WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING THE ARAB SPRING?
2-3 (2001), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/66443833/Opening-Closed-Regimes-What-
Was-the-Role-of-Social-Media-During-the-Arab-Spring; Wim van de Donk et al., Introduction:
Social Movements and ICTs, in CYBERPROTEST: NEW MEDIA, CITIZENS, AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 1 (Wim van de Donk et al. eds., 2004); Larry Diamond, Liberation Technology,
J. DEMOCRACY, July 2010, at 69, 69-70; Lee Baker, Note, The Unintended Consequences of
U.S. Export Restrictions on Software and Online Services for American Foreign Policy and
Human Rights, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 537, 555-57, 560-61 (2010).
3. The term “Arab Spring” describes the series of popular protests and rebellions in the
Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Arab Hopes, U.S.
Worries: Fears of Radicalism and Israeli Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A1.
4. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. But see, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Internet Alone
Cannot Free the Middle East, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/6f6f0c3c-58bc-11e0-9b8a-00144feab49a.html (warning that authoritarian regimes
might use social media as a means of surveillance or propaganda).
5. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 186 (2008); see also id. at 143-60; Zeynep Tufekci, Social Media and Dynamics
of Collective Action Under Durable Authoritarianism: Observations from Tahrir Square, 62
J. COMM. 363 (2012).
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off or filter Internet access amidst widespread protests in their
countries.6 
Censorship by authoritarian governments, however, is not the
only reason that users sometimes cannot reach social media ser-
vices; sometimes, the American companies producing social media
services prevent users in certain countries from accessing them.7
These companies do not restrict access because of disagreement
with foreign users’ revolutionary causes; on the contrary, some
social media companies quite vocally believe that their services may
help promote freedom in the face of tyranny.8 Rather, what moti-
vates these companies to block foreign users is the fear that failing
to do so would subject them to liability under America’s economic
sanctions regime—specifically, the export and import regulations
administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC).9 
Export regulations are just one of many tools in America’s eco-
nomic sanctions arsenal.10 The penalties can include steep fines and
even imprisonment.11 Many export attorneys agree that U.S. export
regulations cover foreign access to social media tools and advise
their clients to block users in embargoed countries.12 Faced with
6. Sam Gustin, Digital Diplomacy, TIME (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2091589_2091591_2091592,00.html.
7. See, e.g., Eric Lai, Should Facebook, Twitter Follow IM Providers and Block Access to
U.S. “Enemies”?, COMPUTERWORLD (June 11, 2009, 10:34 AM), http://www.computerworld.
com/s/article/9134233/Should_Facebook_Twitter_follow_IM_providers_and_block_access_t
o_U.S._enemies_.
8. See, e.g., Biz Stone & Alexander Macgillivray, The Tweets Must Flow, TWITTER BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2011, 12:27 PM), http://blog.twitter.com/2011/01/tweets-must-flow.html.
9. See, e.g., EVEGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET
FREEDOM 205-06 (2011); Cindy Cohn & Jillian C. York, EFF to Obama Administration:
Syrians Deserve Access to Communications and Information Tools, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 6, 2011, 2:10 PM), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2011/07/eff-u-
s-treasury-and-commerce-time-clarify-u-s; While White-Listing Syria, LinkedIn Keeps Sudan’s
Internet Users Blocked!, ARABCRUNCH EN (Apr. 20, 2009), http://arabcrunch.com/2009/04/
while-white-listing-syria-linkedin-keeps-sudan-blocked.html; see also Lai, supra note 7.
10. See Richard N. Haass, Introduction to ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 1, 1-2 (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998). To conserve space and promote clarity, this
Note will hereinafter refer to export and import regulations jointly as “export regulations.”
11. For example, criminal penalties for willful violation of the Iranian embargo include
fines of up to $1,000,000 and imprisonment for up to twenty years. 31 C.F.R. § 560.701 (2011).
Civil penalties consist of fines ranging from $250,000 to twice the value of each wrongful
transaction, whichever is greater. Id.
12. See Lai, supra note 7.
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such potentially crippling liability, some companies have gone
further to block entirely U.S.-based users if they have even a weak
affiliation with a sanctioned country.13 Although some export regu-
lations target only those individuals appearing on a “specially
designated nationals” list for a given country, smaller companies
operating under tight legal budgets—or even large companies that
conclude their limited resources are better spent elsewhere—may
decide that blocking all users in that country is the easiest,
cheapest, or safest option.14
Paradoxically, America’s highest-ranking officials have repeatedly
highlighted the critical importance of American social media in
helping politically repressed populations organize and express
themselves.15 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has actively
embraced the cause of “Internet freedom,” proclaiming that the
United States “want[s] to put [social media] tools in the hands of
people who will use them to advance democracy and human
rights.”16 Indeed, in mid-2009 the State Department asked Twitter
—a popular social media tool that enables users to publish and
exchange short messages with each other17—to postpone scheduled
maintenance so that the service would be available during a crucial
period of protests in Iran.18 Even President Obama has referenced
social media’s power to galvanize political opposition. In a 2011
speech criticizing Syria for mimicking Iran’s violent response to
13. See, e.g., Evegeny Morozov, Do-It-Yourself Censorship, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/06/do-it-yourself-censorship.html (describing
the decision by Bluehost, an American web hosting provider, to suspend the blog of the U.S.-
based Belarussian American Association, “one of the oldest and most visible U.S.-based
groups pushing for democracy in Belarus,” because of its association with that sanctioned
country).
14. See MOROZOV, supra note 9, at 206; Morozov, supra note 13 (“[Bluehost] probably
doesn't have the time or resources to match ... OFAC[’s] [specially designated Belarus
nationals list] with its own customer ranks. Banning everyone from Belarus takes much less
time and effort.”); see also Baker, supra note 2, at 555.
15. See MOROZOV, supra note 9, at 205-06.
16. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21,
2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm; see also Hillary Rodham
Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a
Networked World (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.
17. See About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
18. See Mark Landler & Brian Stelter, With a Hint to Twitter, Washington Taps into a
Potent New Force in Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A12. 
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popular uprisings, Obama remarked that “[t]he image of a young
woman dying in the streets is still seared in our memory,”19 a
reference to a YouTube video viewed hundreds of thousands of times
around the world depicting the graphic death of twenty-six-year-old
Neda Agha-Soltan in Tehran.20 
Fortunately, the Obama administration has substantiated its
support of foreign access to American social media through efforts
to immunize social media companies from liability under export
regulations. In March 2010, OFAC issued a general license “auth-
orizing the exportation of certain personal Internet-based communi-
cations services—such as instant messaging, chat and email, and
social networking” to Iran, Sudan, and Cuba.21 Treasury officials
boasted that the move would “foster and support the free flow of
information—a basic human right—for all Iranians.”22 When
President Obama announced an escalation in U.S. sanctions against
Syria in August 2011,23 OFAC issued another general license auth-
orizing the exportation to Syria of “services incident to the exchange
of personal communications over the Internet ... provided that such
services are publicly available at no cost to the user.”24 And in
March 2012, OFAC published interpretive guidance on the personal
communications license for Iran, providing more specific examples
of the types of services the general license encompasses and
19. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on the Middle East
and North Africa (May 19, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/
19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa.
20. See Nazila Fathi, In a Death Seen Around the World, a Symbol of Iranian Protests: A
Young Woman’s Fate Resonates, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A1. 
21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Issues New General
License to Boost Internet-Based Communication, Free Flow of Information in Iran (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg577.aspx. General licenses
authorize a certain category of transactions, whereas specific licenses authorize particular
entities to engage in particular transactions. 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (2011).
22. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 21.
23. See Exec. Order No. 13,582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 17, 2011).
24. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
LICENSE NO. 5: EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN SERVICES INCIDENT TO INTERNET-BASED
COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORIZED (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria_gl5.pdf.
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establishing a “favorable licensing policy” for certain services not
covered by the general license.25 
Despite these efforts, however, it is not clear that social media
companies actually need any license to avoid liability under the
export regulations. Although welcoming the government’s willing-
ness to make exceptions for certain countries, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF)—a public interest organization dedi-
cated to defending civil liberties online26—has criticized these efforts
as “piecemeal” and has called for the “unlicensed distribution of
communications tools and services to people in all countries of the
world.”27 EFF argues that Congress affirmatively revoked the
President’s power to regulate the exportation of social media
services, meaning that no license is required for a company to do
so.28 Specifically, in 1988, Congress amended the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA)29 and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)30 to withdraw the President’s “authority to
regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, the importation from any
country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or
otherwise, of publications, films, posters, phonograph records,
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, or other informational
materials.”31 This is known as the Berman Amendment.32 The 1994
25. BARBARA C. HAMMERLE, ACTING DIR., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE AND STATEMENT OF LICENSING POLICY ON INTERNET FREEDOM IN IRAN
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/documents/
internet_freedom.pdf. President Obama announced the new guidance in a video address to
the Iranian people, underscoring the administration’s recognition of the significance of this
problem. See Ben Rhodes, On Nowruz, President Obama Speaks to the Iranian People, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:05 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/20/ nowruz-
president-obama-speaks-iranian-people.
26. About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about (last visited
Sept. 23, 2012).
27. See Jillian C. York & Cindy Cohn, Stop the Piecemeal, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2011/09/stop-the-
piecemeal-export-approach. The author researched this topic as a summer legal intern at EFF
in 2011.
28. See Cohn & York, supra note 9.
29. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2006).
30. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
31. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502, 102
Stat. 1107, 1371-72 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)).
32. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1009, 1011 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that the amendment was named after its congressional sponsor, Representative
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Free Trade in Ideas Act expanded the Berman Amendment to apply
“regardless of format or medium of transmission” to “any informa-
tion or informational materials.”33 It also added examples of rela-
tively newer media to the Berman Amendment’s examples of
exempt media.34
This Note argues that the Berman Amendment and Free Trade
in Ideas Act—hereinafter referred to jointly as the “Informational
Amendments”—do in fact prohibit the President from regulating
foreign access to American social media under the U.S. sanctions
regime.35 Some commentators have considered the effect of export
restrictions on social media from a pure First Amendment per-
spective,36 and others have reviewed the effect of the Informational
Amendments on the regulation of more traditional media.37
Although one author has highlighted the costs of “regulatory con-
fusion” over the applicability of the Informational Amendments to
social media, his study did not attempt to clarify the confusion.38
This Note carries the inquiry forward by directly analyzing the
Informational Amendments and OFAC’s export regulations in the
context of social media, primarily through the lenses of stat-
utory interpretation and case law analysis. Although the First
Howard L. Berman).
33. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236,
§ 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3))
(emphasis added).
34. Id. (adding “compact disks, CD ROMs, ... and news wire feeds”).
35. There is a separate argument that the President may not regulate access to social
media under a different IEEPA provision that exempts “any postal, telegraphic, telephonic,
or other personal communication.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1). Nevertheless, this Note
concentrates exclusively on the Informational Amendments. Not only has there been more
litigation focusing on the informational exemptions, see infra Part IV.B, but the
communications exemption’s focus on personal communications raises the complicated
question of whether social media primarily facilitates personal communications, commercial
communications, both, or neither.
36. See Nadia L. Luhr, Note, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanctions: The First
Amendment Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 500, 502 (2010).
37. See, e.g., Tracy A. Chin, Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFAC’s Regulations
Restrain First Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1883, 1885 (2008) (publishing activities);
Pamela S. Falk, Note, Broadcasting from Enemy Territory and the First Amendment: The
Importation of Informational Materials from Cuba Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 165, 165 (1992) (live television broadcasts); Leslie Jose Zigel, Comment,
Constricting the Clave: The United States, Cuban Music, and the New World Order, 26 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 129, 137-38 (1994) (live music performances).
38. See Baker, supra note 2, at 552-55.
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Amendment is critical to this inquiry,39 courts prefer to dispose of
issues on nonconstitutional grounds when possible.40 Consequently,
the First Amendment plays a supporting, rather than principal, role
in this Note’s argument.
Part I provides an overview of the President’s export regulatory
authority under TWEA and IEEPA, including the legislative history
of the Informational Amendments and OFAC’s implementation of
informational  exemptions in its export regulations. Part II ana-
lyzes OFAC’s regulations as well as its interpretative letters to
determine whether the Agency could indeed conclude that providing
access to social media violates export regulations. Part III examines
whether OFAC’s regulations comport with the requirements of the
Informational Amendments. Part IV reviews four cases in which
federal courts have considered the Informational Amendments and
OFAC’s regulations in the context of traditional media. It then
discusses the implications of those decisions for a potential social
media plaintiff. Finally, Part V outlines and evaluates the choices
that American social media companies face as they navigate the
statutory, regulatory, and judicial frameworks in this area.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT’S EXPORT REGULATORY AUTHORITY
A. TWEA, IEEPA, and the President’s Delegation of Power to
OFAC
Two statutes authorize the President to regulate exports and
imports during national crises: the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917 (TWEA)41 and the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act of 1977 (IEEPA).42 Enacted shortly after the United States
declared war on Germany during World War I,43 TWEA “codif[ied]
39. See, e.g., infra notes 55-57, 61, 143-49, 160-66, 192-98 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (declining to
reach constitutional claims “when statutory interpretation suffice[d]” to find that OFAC acted
inappropriately). See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,
445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that
courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).
41. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2006). 
42. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
43. See Suanne C. Milligan, Comment, Another Inning in Cuban-United States Relations:
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. v. Brady, 2 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 281, 293 (1991).
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the principle that it is illegal for a person subject to United States
jurisdiction to engage in trade or commerce with a declared enemy
of the United States.”44 Regarding exports and imports, TWEA
enables the President “[d]uring the time of war ... [to] investigate,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ...
importation or exportation of ... any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest.”45 TWEA originally
required a congressional declaration of war, but a 1933 amendment
enabled the President to exercise his TWEA powers by simply
declaring a “state of national emergency” during peacetime.46
Decades later, however, Congress reacted to growing executive
overreach in foreign affairs by restoring TWEA’s strict wartime
requirement.47 
The same year, Congress enacted IEEPA to separately govern the
President’s peacetime emergency regulatory powers.48 Although it
“recodifies virtually the same range of [peacetime] powers” that the
President formerly enjoyed under TWEA, IEEPA added require-
ments that the President consult with and report to Congress before
and during his exercise of peacetime regulatory powers.49 The
President has not generally exercised his TWEA and IEEPA powers
directly. In 1942, Franklin Roosevelt delegated his economic regu-
latory powers under TWEA to the Treasury Department.50 Two
decades later, the Treasury Department created OFAC to exercise
these delegated powers.51 On the other hand, the President dele-
gates his IEEPA powers to the Treasury Department on a case-by-
case basis.52 The Treasury Department typically redelegates the
44. Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2000).
45. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (2006).
46. KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 93 (2009).
47. Id. at 95; Luong, supra note 44, at 1188.
48. ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 95.
49. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006).
50. Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 Fed. Reg. 5205, 5206 (July 9, 1942).
51. Office of Foreign Assets Control: Authority and Functions, 32 Fed. Reg. 3472, 3472
(Feb. 27, 1967) (amending Treasury Department Order 128).
52. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209, 52,210-11 (Aug. 17, 2011)
(delegation to implement Syrian sanctions); Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685,
26,685-86 (Apr. 17, 1980) (delegation to implement Iranian sanctions).
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President’s IEEPA authority to OFAC within the export regulations
themselves.53 
B. The Informational Amendments to TWEA and IEEPA
1. The Berman Amendment
Beginning in 1988, Congress undertook to exclude from the
President’s TWEA and IEEPA powers the ability to regulate the
importation or exportation of certain types of information and
informational materials. Its first attempt was the Berman Amend-
ment, which specified that the President’s powers under those acts
“do[ ] not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or
indirectly, the importation from any country, or the exportation to
any country, whether commercial or otherwise, of publications,
films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, micro-
fiche, tapes, or other informational materials.”54 Aside from a bare
repetition of its text, the Berman Amendment’s direct legislative
history offers few details about its genesis or purpose.55 However, a
House Foreign Affairs Committee report stated that Congress
premised the Berman Amendment on a 1985 resolution by the
American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, which declared that
“no prohibitions should exist on imports to the United States of
ideas and information if their circulation is protected by the First
53. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 542.802 (2011) (delegation to OFAC in the Syrian Sanctions
Regulations).
54. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502, 102
Stat. 1107, 1371-72 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)). It is important
to note that neither of the Informational Amendments exempt materials that are separately
regulated under 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 or under certain sections of the Export Administration
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-
2420 (2006)) [hereinafter EAA], both of which largely regulate exports raising direct national
security threats. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub.
L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 § 2502. However, free and publicly available software—even when it contains
encryption—is exempt from EAA regulation. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.3(b)(3), 734.7(b)-(c) (2011);
76 Fed. Reg. 1059, 1059-60 (Jan. 7, 2011). This Note assumes that social media is not
regulated under the EAA or 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799, and so would be exemptible under the
Informational Amendments.
55. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 839 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1872; see also Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1547-48 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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Amendment.”56 The Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that this
principle should apply to exports as well.”57
2. The Free Trade in Ideas Act
Congress subsequently amended TWEA and IEEPA with the
1994 Free Trade in Ideas Act (FTIA).58 FTIA broadened the infor-
mational exception to the President’s export regulation powers,
expanding the Berman Amendment to deny the President the
authority to regulate the export or import of informational materials
“whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium
of transmission.”59 FTIA also affirmed the illustrative nature of the
Berman Amendment’s list of exempt media by prepending to it the
phrase “including but not limited to,” as well as by adding to it
examples of newer media that had emerged in the six years after
the enactment of the Berman Amendment.60 
FTIA’s legislative history explicitly confirms the First Amend-
ment basis for the Informational Amendments.61 The conference
report explained that the Berman Amendment “was explicitly
intended, by including the words ‘directly or indirectly,’ to have a
broad scope.”62 Indeed, Congress positioned FTIA in such a way as
a response to OFAC’s attempts to narrowly interpret the Berman
Amendment, for example by limiting “the type of information that
is protected or ... the medium or method of transmitting the infor-
mation.”63 The conference report also detailed FTIA’s objective: to
expand the scope of the Amendment to include “transactions and
activities incident to the flow of information and informational ma-
terials,” particularly transactions related to “electronically transmit-
56. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987); see also Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1548.
57. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113.
58. Foreign Relations Authorization Act § 525.
59. Id.
60. See id. (adding “compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds”).
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 239 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
398, 483 (“[The Berman Amendment] established that no embargo may prohibit or restrict
directly or indirectly the import or export of information that is protected under the First
Amendment.”).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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ted information, ... which must normally be entered into in advance
of the information's creation.”64
C. OFAC’s Implementation of the Informational Amendments
After Congress enacted the Berman Amendment in 1988, OFAC
amended its existing export regulations to implement the required
informational exceptions.65 OFAC has included informational
exceptions in its subsequently issued export regulations as well.66
The beginning text of OFAC’s informational exceptions mimics that
of the Informational Amendments. For instance, the Iranian
Transactions Regulations (ITRs) provide that “[t]he importation
from any country and the exportation to any country of information
and informational materials as defined in section 560.315, whether
commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of trans-
mission, are exempt from the prohibitions and regulations of this
part.”67
Thereafter, however, OFAC’s informational exceptions deviate
from the text of the Informational Amendments—sometimes subtly,
sometimes less so. For example, the ITRs’ definition of informa-
tional materials includes the exact same list of exempt media as in
FTIA, yet OFAC prepends the ITRs’ list with the term “includes”
rather than FTIA’s seemingly broader phrase “including but not
limited to.”68 More significantly, OFAC affirmatively narrows the
scope of exempted information by retaining the authority to regulate
transactions related to information and informational materials
not fully created and in existence at the date of the transactions,
or ... the substantive or artistic alteration or enhancement of
informational materials, or ... the provision of marketing and
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations and Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
54 Fed. Reg. 5229, 5230 (Feb. 2, 1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 500, 515) (amending the
Cuban embargo).
66. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 542.206(b), 560.210(c) (2011).
67. Id. § 560.210(c)(1).
68. Compare Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L.
No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994), with 31 C.F.R. § 560.315(a). Not all of OFAC’s
regulations make this omission, however. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 548.304 (informational
exception in Belarus Sanctions Regulations).
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business consulting services ... [or] services to market, produce or
co-produce, create or assist in the creation of information and
informational materials.69
OFAC appears to have exercised independent discretion in imple-
menting this narrowing provision, as there is no clear basis for it in
the Informational Amendments or other authority.70
II. OFAC’S REGULATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Although there is no evidence that OFAC has actively enforced its
regulations against American companies providing access to social
media in sanctioned countries, the Agency’s decision to issue general
licenses for such activity in certain countries strongly suggests that
OFAC believes its regulations otherwise apply.71 This Part examines
the basis upon which OFAC might reach that conclusion.
A. OFAC’s Regulations Construed Against a Hypothetical Social
Media Service
The best starting point in determining whether and how OFAC
believes its export regulations reach social media services is to walk
through the regulations themselves and consider how OFAC might
apply them to such activity. Consider, for example, the restrictions
laid out in the ITRs.72 The ITRs forbid “the exportation, reexpor-
tation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States,
or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, tech-
nology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran.”73 “Services”
69. 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
70. See Memorandum regarding OFAC’s Interpretation of IEEPA’s “Informational
Materials” Exemption, from Allan Adler & Marc Brodsky, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, to
Interested Persons 3 (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.pspcentral.org/
commpublicaffairs/attachPubAff-PubIss/OFAC_background.doc.
71. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
72. This Section purposefully ignores the recent general license authorizing access to
American social media in Iran. See supra note 21. Indeed, the purpose of this Note is to
demonstrate that a license is not required for such activity. See supra text accompanying note
28.
73. 31 C.F.R. § 560.204. “Iran” includes any territory “over which the Government of Iran
claims sovereignty,” id. § 560.303, and “person” includes business entities such as corpo-
rations, id. § 560.305.
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encompass any service provided by an American entity whether
performed entirely in the United States or overseas.74 The threshold
question is therefore not where the service is itself performed, but
rather whether the service is performed “on behalf of a person in
Iran or ... the benefit of such services is otherwise received in
Iran.”75 
With these regulations in mind, consider a hypothetical U.S.
company called Blabber that operates an eponymous social media
service. Blabber allows its users to publicly or privately share typed
messages with other users. Blabber is incorporated and based in
California, and all of its employees, assets, and computer servers
are located in the United States. However, the service is available
to users worldwide when they navigate their desktop or mobile web
browsers to http://www.blabber.com. Suppose Blabber quickly be-
comes popular in Iran and soon has several thousand active users
there. In the vocabulary of the ITRs, the company is a “United
States person” providing a “service,” the benefit of which is “received
in Iran” because it is used and accessed by users located there.76 The
ITRs thus prohibit Blabber from making its service available to
Iranian users; absent some exception, the company would have to
block access in Iran or face serious liability.77 
The critical question is whether the ITRs’ informational excep-
tions, which OFAC implemented pursuant to the Informational
Amendments,78 prohibit the agency from regulating Blabber’s
activity. The ITRs purport to exempt from regulation “information
and informational materials ... whether commercial or otherwise,
regardless of format or medium of transmission.”79 However, OFAC
has enumerated the types of informational media that the exemp-
tion “includes.”80 Although the list incorporates some computer
media like CD ROMs, it does not refer to information created,
stored, and exchanged exclusively online.81 If OFAC interprets the
74. See id. § 560.410(a).
75. See id.
76. Cf. supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 11. Again, this analysis ignores the recent general license authorizing
this activity. See supra note 72.
78. See supra Part I.C.
79. 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(1).
80. See id. § 560.315(a)(1).
81. See id.
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ITRs’ list of exempt media as exhaustive rather than illustrative,
the agency might find an entirely Internet-based service like
Blabber to fall outside the scope of the ITRs’ informational excep-
tions. Of course, OFAC or, more importantly, a court might well
interpret the ITRs’ exempt media list to be illustrative rather than
exhaustive.82 Ultimately, the question matters little in light of the
ITRs’ affirmative narrowing of the scope of exempted transactions.83
OFAC retains the right to regulate any “service[ ] to ... produce or
co-produce, create or assist in the creation of information” as well as
“transactions related to information ... not fully created and in
existence at the date of the transactions.”84 As a service that
empowers users to write and exchange text-based messages,
Blabber has no other purpose than to enable the creation of new
information. OFAC would undoubtedly find Blabber in violation of
the ITRs if the company allowed individuals in Iran to access and
use the service.
B. Guidance from OFAC’s Interpretative Letters
Because there is no record of OFAC enforcing its export regula-
tions in the context of social media, the previous Section constitutes
a mere educated guess at how the Agency could construe its regu-
lations against a social media service like the hypothetical Blabber.
However, an additional source of information sheds further light on
OFAC’s potential reasoning on this subject: the interpretative
letters that OFAC has issued in response to requests for guidance
from private entities.85 Eight of the twenty-four letters published on
OFAC’s website relate to the Agency’s informational exceptions;86
the informational exceptions therefore appear to be an area of great
confusion—or, at least, great interest—for exporting organizations.
82. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
83. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
84. 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2).
85. Interpretative letters are “nonbinding, situation-specific rulings issued by OFAC to
interested parties to give guidance on whether OFAC will interpret certain activities as either
authorized or unauthorized by a trade embargo program.” Chin, supra note 37, at 1890 n.40.
86. See Interpretative Rulings on OFAC Policy, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/rulings-
index.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
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OFAC’s interpretative letters reveal two basic trends in the
Agency’s application of its informational exceptions. First, the
Agency embraces a fairly nuanced definition of “substantive or
artistic alteration or enhancement of informational materials,”
which is one of the categories of transactions that OFAC places
outside the scope of its informational exceptions.87 For instance,
OFAC advises that activities such as translating and copy-editing
text, resizing and repositioning images, checking spelling and
grammar, and deleting superfluous words are nonsubstantive
alterations to information and therefore fit within the Agency’s
informational exceptions.88 This interpretation renders moot any
concern that a social media service like Blabber would violate
OFAC’s regulations by merely reformatting or restyling information
provided by users in sanctioned countries.
Second, OFAC clearly believes that providing embargoed users
with read-only access to an electronic database of preexisting
information is an exempt activity under the Agency’s informational
exceptions.89 In fact, a read-only database service is exempt even if
it visually enhances or reformats information provided by sanc-
tioned users; so long as the enhancement does not alter the informa-
tion’s substance, add new information, or provide a paid marketing
service, OFAC will not regulate it.90 A company may even allow
sanctioned users to conduct searches across electronic databases of
preexisting information, so long as the search function “does no
more than search and sort the exempt information.”91 The key
87. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2).
88. See Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control (July 19,
2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/gn071904.pdf
[hereinafter Letter of July 19, 2004]; Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign
Assets Control, (July 6, 2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
ia070604.pdf [hereinafter Letter of July 6, 2004]; Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir.,
Office of Foreign Assets Control (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Documents/ia040504.pdf [hereinafter Letter of April 2, 2004].
89. See Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control (Dec. 11,
2003), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ia121603.pdf.
90. See id.; Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control (July
8, 2003), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ia070803.pdf.
91. See R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIR., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, GUIDANCE ON
INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Documents/infomat2.pdf; Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets
Control (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
ia043003.pdf.
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takeaway from these interpretative letters is OFAC’s emphasis that
its informational exceptions do not extend to services that exceed
the facilitation of access to, or the superficial enhancement of,
preexisting information; if a service goes beyond providing access to
information and enables the addition or creation of new information,
it is no longer exempt from OFAC’s regulations. The essence of a
social media service like the hypothetical Blabber, of course, is not
only the access it provides to existing information, but also the
ability it gives users to create and share new information. OFAC’s
interpretative letters thus affirm the conclusion that the Agency
would find Blabber and similar services to fall outside the informa-
tional exceptions and be subject to standard export regulations.92 
Yet OFAC’s interpretative letters conceal a subtle contradiction
that warrants closer scrutiny. The Agency’s purported rationale for
not exempting services and transactions for new information is to
avoid incentivizing the creation of information that would not exist
without American assistance or enticement.93 Nevertheless, OFAC
permits print publishers to accept and publish journal articles or
newspaper op-eds from sanctioned authors.94 The opportunity to be
published in a newspaper or academic journal surely incentivizes
many authors to create new works, yet this is the very encourage-
ment that OFAC seeks to avoid by regulating information creation
services. In terms of incentivizing the creation of information, there
appears to be little distinction between print publishing services
and an electronic service like Blabber that enables authors to
publish new information directly.
Perhaps OFAC would argue that electronic media differs from
print media in that print authors do not create information directly
in the medium itself; instead, authors prepare their works in
advance and then submit them through a human-powered editorial
and publication process. As a result, the Agency might argue that
printed information is exempted as “preexisting” because it ap-
peared in another format before it was published, whereas a social
media service like Blabber provides a mechanism for authors to
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. See Falk, supra note 37, at 169.
94. See Letter of July 19, 2004, supra note 88; Letter of July 6, 2004, supra note 88; Letter
of April 2, 2004, supra note 88.
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create and publish new information instantaneously, rendering it
nonexempt.95 
But in light of OFAC’s rationale for regulating the creation of new
information, the appropriate measure would not be how the infor-
mation is published but rather whether the service incentivizes the
creation of new information at all. Academic journals and newspa-
pers incentivize authors to create information in the same manner
as social media. If OFAC is ever asked to issue an interpretative
letter on social media, the Agency faces the dilemma of attempting
to justify its exemption of print publishing in the face of continued
regulation of social media publishing, when both equally incentivize
the creation of new information.
III. OFAC’S INFORMATIONAL EXCEPTIONS AND THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE INFORMATIONAL AMENDMENTS
Assuming that OFAC would find a social media service like
Blabber to violate export regulations despite the informational
exceptions, the next question is whether the Agency’s informational
exceptions comply with the requirements of the Informational
Amendments. Two facets of the Informational Amendments bear
scrutiny in this regard: their prohibition on indirect regulation and
their definition of information.96
A. The Prohibition on Indirect Regulation
OFAC excludes from the scope of its informational exceptions all
“transactions related to information ... not fully created and in
existence at the date of the transactions” as well as any “services to
... produce or co-produce, create or assist in the creation of informa-
tion.”97 One commentator has suggested that OFAC implemented
these provisions to avoid incentivizing the creation of information
that would not exist without American support.98 However, the
Informational Amendments withdraw from the President’s TWEA
and IEEPA powers “the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or
95. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2) (2011).
96. This Section uses the ITRs for purposes of analysis.
97. See 31 CFR § 560.210(c)(2).
98. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 37, at 169.
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indirectly,” the exportation or importation of information.99 OFAC’s
continued regulation of services and transactions related to new
information is suspect as an impermissible indirect regulation of
information, especially in the context of a social media service like
Blabber. Social media services not only provide a means to create
new information but also simultaneously constitute the very medi-
um of both new and preexisting information.100 True, separating the
“information creation” function from the “information consumption”
function in a service like Blabber is not technically impossible.101
However, it is unlikely that a company would ever implement such
a measure. For instance, the value of Blabber to an Iranian user
would be greatly diminished if neither she nor anyone else in her
country could create and share new information; although there is
something to be said for social media as a tool for information
consumption alone, the inherent value of social media is the ability
to create and share new information with others.
Instead of blocking the information creation function for sanc-
tioned countries, companies like Blabber would likely choose to
exclude those users from their services altogether; it makes little
sense for a company to spend time and resources implementing a
special read-only version of a service when it will offer the user
significantly reduced value. When a company does completely block
access to its social media service for a sanctioned country, the
existing information in the service created by users from the United
States and other countries will also be blocked. For social media,
99. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994) (emphasis added).
100. Contrast social media with newspaper or video recordings; one can readily regulate
printers without simultaneously regulating newspapers, or regulate video cameras without
simultaneously regulating videotapes, because they are physically separate from each other.
On the other hand, social media information—a Tweet, a Facebook update, etc.—is usually
created and consumed in the exact same online interface.
101. For example, the hypothetical Blabber company could create a version of its social
media service for Iranian users that allows them to read preexisting information but disables
their ability to create new information themselves. Software is available that allows
companies to serve different content or features to users based on their location. See, e.g.,
GEOPLUGIN, http://www.geoplugin.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). Notably, users can easily
evade such measures by directing their Internet connection through a proxy server located
in another country. See Nik Cubrilovic, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re Not in the USA,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 5, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/10/05/internet-anonymizer-web-surf-
vpn-hulu-pandora-spotify.
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therefore, OFAC’s direct regulation of services to create new
information constructively amounts to a forbidden indirect regula-
tion of preexisting information.102
B. Definition of Information
The Informational Amendments set the scope of exempt informa-
tion broadly, prohibiting the President from regulating “any infor-
mation or informational materials.”103 This prohibition extends to
information “whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format
or medium of transmission.”104 In contrast, OFAC’s regulations—the
ITRs, for example—include a separate section that describes pre-
cisely which categories of information are exempt and which are
not.105 The ITRs’ definition of information deviates from the
Information Amendments in two potentially problematic ways.
First, whereas the Informational Amendments’ list of exempt
media is specified as “including but not limited to” the items in the
list,106 OFAC says the ITRs’ list only “includes” those items.107 The
omission of the words “but not limited to” might suggest that OFAC
intends for the ITRs’ exempt media list to be exhaustive rather than
illustrative. Ultimately, what OFAC intends will not matter: courts
generally interpret the term “including,” even when used on its own,
to imply illustration rather than restriction.108 Although it is encour-
aging that a court would likely find OFAC’s omission of “but not
limited to” to have no express limiting effect on the scope of infor-
mation exempted by the ITRs, the danger remains that lawyers will
counsel companies like Blabber to interpret the omission conserva-
102. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
103. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act § 525 (emphasis added).
104. See id.
105. Compare id., with 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(1) (2011). Although OFAC does retain the
Informational Amendments’ statement that informational materials are exempt “whether
commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission,” this language
refers to the separate definitional section and thus the two must be read in conjunction. See
31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(1).
106. Foreign Relations Authorization Act § 525.
107. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.315(a). Again, however, not all of OFAC’s export regulations omit
“but not limited to” from their exceptions. See supra note 68.
108. See In re Mark Anthony Constr., Inc., 886 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989) (collecting
cases).
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tively as evidence of OFAC’s intent to regulate any media not
included in the ITRs’ list.
Second, the narrowing provision in the ITRs’ definition of
information affirmatively retains OFAC’s power to regulate not-yet-
existing information as well as services that create information.109
Although OFAC might defend this restriction on pragmatic
grounds,110 there is no discernible support for its position in the
Informational Amendments.111 Quite the contrary, in fact: the
legislative history of FTIA specifically states that the Informational
Amendments should be read to prohibit the regulation of “electroni-
cally transmitted information, transactions for which must normally
be entered into in advance of the information's creation.”112 In light
of such clear congressional intent to exempt any transactions
required to create and transmit electronic information, OFAC’s
purported regulation of social media services like Blabber appears
to be improper.
IV. LESSONS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA FROM CASE LAW
Although there has yet to be a formal legal challenge to OFAC’s
purported regulation of social media in light of the Informational
Amendments, courts have considered the question in the context of
more traditional media such as posters, paintings, television broad-
casts, and even educational travel.113 These precedents could help
to guide a company’s litigation strategy should it decide to sue
OFAC for impermissibly regulating its social media service.114 This
Part begins with a discussion of the standard of review that courts
use when reviewing executive agencies’ interpretations and imple-
mentations of statutory requirements. It then briefly describes the
facts and holdings from four cases in which plaintiffs challenged
OFAC’s interpretation of the Informational Amendments in the
context of traditional media. The Part concludes by extrapolating
109. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c)(2); see also supra Part III.B.
110. See supra text accompanying note 98.
111. See supra text accompanying note 69.
112. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 239 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
398, 483.
113. See infra Part IV.B.
114. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
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from these varied precendents a potential strategy for making a
legal challenge to OFAC’s regulation of social media.
A. The Standard of Judicial Review: The Chevron Test
The critical starting point is to understand the standard of review
that courts apply in reviewing an agency’s interpretation and
implementation of a statute. The Supreme Court established the
standard in the seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.115 Chevron held that when reviewing
a challenge to an agency’s interpretation of a statute the agency is
charged with administering, a court must first ask whether
Congress has clearly addressed the issue in question through the
legislative process.116 If it has, the court “must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”117 If Congress was
silent or ambiguous on the matter, however, the court must deter-
mine whether the agency’s interpretation and implementation of a
measure is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”118
A permissible construction is one that is reasonable; that is, the
agency’s action cannot be “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”119 As will be seen, the courts that have
reviewed OFAC’s implementation of the Informational Amendments
have split as to whether OFAC is entitled to deference under the
Chevron standard.
B. Traditional Media Case Law
1. Walsh: The Scope of the Prohibition on “Indirect” Regulation
The earliest cases to scrutinize the effects of the Informational
Amendments on access to media arose shortly after Congress
enacted the Berman Amendment. In 1989, the District Court for the
District of Columbia considered Daniel Walsh’s complaint against
OFAC for having denied him a license to travel to Cuba in order to
115. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
116. Id. at 842.
117. Id. at 843.
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 844.
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negotiate for, purchase, and arrange the importation of political
posters from Cuba into the United States.120 Although the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations (CACRs) generally prohibited Americans
from traveling to Cuba, they authorized OFAC to issue discretionary
licenses for travel related to the “[e]xportation, importation, or
transmission of information or informational materials.”121 Walsh
argued that because traveling to Cuba was critical to his ability to
import posters from that country, OFAC’s denial of a travel license
constituted an impermissible indirect regulation on the impor-
tation of informational materials under the Berman Amendment.122
Whereas Walsh argued that the Berman Amendment broadly pro-
hibited the President from indirectly regulating informational
materials, OFAC narrowly interpreted the amendment to mean that
only “transactions directly incident to the physical importation or
exportation of informational materials” were immune from regula-
tion and argued that travel restrictions did not fall in that category
of transactions.123 
OFAC argued that the Berman Amendment required this narrow
reading for two reasons. First, Congress had “long been aware” of
travel restrictions in OFAC’s sanctions regulations, yet it did not
directly address travel restrictions in the Berman Amendment’s
text.124 Second, the broad interpretation that Walsh proposed would
infringe on the President’s “established foreign policy” prerog-
atives.125 The court agreed with OFAC.126 It cited Supreme Court
precedent holding that unless Congress “clearly indicates the con-
trary,” courts must presume that Congress ratifies the President’s
restriction of travel “in furtherance of this nation’s foreign
affairs.”127 
120. See Walsh v. Brady, 729 F. Supp. 118, 118 (D.D.C. 1989).
121. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(11) (2011).
122. See Walsh, 729 F. Supp. at 118-19. It is important to note that this case preceded the
1994 enactment of FTIA.
123. See id. at 119 (emphasis added) (quoting Foreign Assets Control Regulations and
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 5229, 5234 (Feb. 2, 1989) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pts. 500, 515)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 120.
127. Id. (citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 236 (1984)).
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The Walsh court held that OFAC had reasonably interpreted and
implemented the Berman Amendment because the amendment
“lack[ed] any meaningful legislative history” and its text did not
clearly indicate a congressional intent to prohibit travel-related
restrictions.128 The court said that Walsh “reache[d] too far” in
arguing that the court should simply infer such a broad “intrusion
on presidential authority in the field of foreign policy.”129 Concluding
that the Berman Amendment’s prohibition on indirect regulation
did not prevent OFAC from regulating Walsh’s travel, despite the
criticality of such travel to his ability to import informational mate-
rials from Cuba, the court denied Walsh relief.130 
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reviewed Walsh, specifically examining whether OFAC was entitled
to Chevron deference in its interpretation and application of the
Berman Amendment.131 Under the first prong of the Chevron test,
Walsh argued that Congress clearly intended for the Berman
Amendment’s exemptions to extend to travel because the prohibi-
tion on indirect regulation “extinguish[ed] any executive authority
... to impose any regulation that significantly burdens trade in
informational materials.”132 The D.C. Circuit rejected this interpre-
tation as dangerously broad because it could theoretically empower
the Cuban government to short-circuit the larger economic em-
bargo.133 The court found no basis in the Berman Amendment’s text
or legislative history to suggest that Congress intended such an
outcome.134 On the second prong of Chevron, the court concluded
that OFAC’s travel regulations were not an unreasonable applica-
tion of the Berman Amendment as they balanced Congress’s desire
to “relax” restrictions on informational imports with the need to
retain the vitality of the wider Cuban embargo.135 The D.C. Circuit
128. Id. at 119-20.
129. Id. at 120.
130. Id.
131. See Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1231-34 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Walsh also appealed on
First and Fifth Amendment grounds; the court rejected those claims, using rational basis
review but held in the alternative that OFAC’s implementation of the information exception
should withstand strict scrutiny review if applied. Id. at 1234-38.
132. Id. at 1232 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1233-34.
322 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:297
therefore affirmed the trial court’s ruling and denied relief to
Walsh.136
2. Cernuda: The First Amendment and the Scope of          
“Informational Materials”
Shortly before the Walsh court issued its decision in 1989, the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida delivered its
opinion in Cernuda v. Heavey, another case involving the importa-
tion of Cuban artwork.137 Rather than deciding the extent to which
OFAC could regulate information as in Walsh, the Cernuda court
had to determine the scope of the term “information or informa-
tional materials.”138 Ramon Cernuda, a museum director, sued
OFAC for seizing from him approximately two hundred Cuban
paintings following an art exhibition in Miami.139 Although Cernuda
had sought a license from OFAC to import and show the paintings,
the Agency had never responded to his request.140 Cernuda argued
that Congress meant for the Berman Amendment to exempt all
works protected by the First Amendment.141 OFAC, on the other
hand, claimed that the Berman Amendment protected strictly
“informational” works, not works that were “merely aesthetic.”142
Because the Berman Amendment did not expressly enumerate
artwork in its list of exempt media,143 the Cernuda court turned to
the amendment’s legislative history to determine whether Congress
intended “other informational materials” to encompass works of
art.144 Noting that the Berman Amendment’s direct legislative his-
tory offered little to no assistance, the court relied on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, which adopted the American
Bar Association’s conclusion that “no prohibitions should exist on
imports to the United States of ideas and information if their cir-
136. Id. at 1238.
137. 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
138. See id. at 1549.
139. Id. at 1545.
140. Id. at 1546.
141. Id. at 1549.
142. Id.
143. See id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
144. Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1549.
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culation is protected by the First Amendment.”145 The court rejected
OFAC’s argument that Congress merely referenced, and did not
adopt, the ABA resolution.146 Under Chevron, the court concluded
that Congress had clearly intended for the Berman Amendment to
protect any information covered by the First Amendment.147
Because the First Amendment clearly encompasses artwork,
OFAC’s actions violated Congress’s clear intent to protect that
medium.148 The court declined to defer to OFAC under Chevron, and
granted relief to Cernuda.149 The government did not appeal. 
3. Capital Cities/ABC: Tangibility and the Scope of          
“Informational Materials”
In Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York heard another case concerning the
scope of information protected by the Berman Amendment.150 This
time, however, the question was not whether “informational mate-
rials” included a discrete medium like artwork, but rather whether
OFAC could reasonably interpret “informational materials” to
include only tangible media and broadly exclude intangible media
like television signals.151
ABC sued OFAC after the agency denied the television network
a license to broadcast live coverage of the 1991 Pan American
Games from Cuba.152 ABC asked the court for a declaratory judg-
ment that, even without a license, the Berman Amendment per-
145. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987)); see also supra notes 54-57
and accompanying text.
146. See Cernuda, 720 F. Supp. at 1549-50 (finding that the “First Amendment orientation
of the words ‘informational materials’” was “obvious”).
147. Id. at 1549 n.10 (emphasis omitted).
148. OFAC had conceded that artwork was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1549
& n.10.
149. Id. at 1552-54. Even had it found Congress’s intent unclear, the court concluded that
OFAC’s administration of the Berman Amendment was unreasonable under the second prong
of Chevron because the Agency could not justify its ban on importing Cuban paintings with
its simultaneous authorization of the importation of Cuban films; moreover, the court deemed
OFAC’s failure to respond to Cernuda’s original license request to be “arbitrary and
capiricious.” Id. at 1551-52.
150. 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
151. See id. at 1010-11.
152. Id. at 1008.
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mitted live broadcasts from otherwise-sanctioned countries.153 At
the time, the CACRs specifically retained OFAC’s authority to
regulate “[i]ntangible items such as telecommunications transmis-
sions.”154 If the court found that Congress had clearly addressed the
question of tangibility “in either the plain language of the [Berman
Amendment] or its clear legislative history,” it would have been
required under Chevron to enforce Congress’s intent; otherwise, the
court would defer to OFAC’s interpretation so long as that interpre-
tation was not unreasonable.155 
The court determined that the Berman Amendment’s use of
“other informational materials” was “clearly susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation.”156 Reviewing dictionary defi-
nitions, the court found that although the term “materials” normally
refers to physical media, it can also refer to “intangibles such as
ideas, perceptions, observations or data that may be worked into a
more finished form.”157 The court did not find it dispositive that the
Berman Amendment’s illustrative list of media included only tan-
gible media,158 nor could it find any distinction made in the Berman
Amendment’s legislative history between tangible and intangible
media.159 Indeed, in contrast to Cernuda, the Capital Cities/ABC
court expressly declined to acknowledge a congressional adoption of
the ABA resolution stating that all First Amendment-protected
information should be exempt from export regulations.160 
Because neither the Berman Amendment’s text nor its legislative
history provided the court with sufficient evidence of a congressional
intent “so clear as to make judicial deference [to OFAC’s continued
regulation of intangible information] inappropriate,” the court con-
cluded that Chevron required deference to OFAC’s interpretation
unless doing so was “precluded by the First Amendment” or unless
153. Id. at 1010.
154. 31 C.F.R. § 515.332(b)(2) (1989).
155. Capital Cities/ABC, 740 F. Supp. at 1011 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)); see also supra Part IV.A.
156. Capital Cities/ABC, 740 F. Supp. at 1011.
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1011-12.
160. Id. at 1011 n.9 (concluding that the legislative history “does not explicitly adopt or
reject the ABA’s [First Amendment] position” (emphasis added)).
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OFAC’s interpretation was arbitrary or capricious.161 The court
found that the First Amendment did not preclude deference to
OFAC’s continued regulation of intangible informational mate-
rials.162 It defended this conclusion by citing a Second Circuit
opinion that found no constitutional violation in the pre-Berman
Amendment CACRs, which prohibited the importation of any infor-
mational materials whether tangible or intangible.163 The Capital
Cities/ABC court reasoned that if it was constitutional to ban the
importation of any informational materials, it must also be constitu-
tional to ban the importation of some informational materials.164
Similar to Walsh,165 the court noted that the countervailing
constitutional principles of separation of powers and the Executive’s
foreign affairs prerogative outweighed any potential First Amend-
ment problems.166 
The court also held that OFAC’s exclusion of intangible informa-
tion was neither arbitrary nor capricious.167 It concluded that
OFAC’s disparate treatment of tangible and intangible materials
did not deny ABC any special benefit enjoyed by entities trading in
tangible media like newspapers or magazines,168 nor did it create a
danger of impermissible content-based speech discrimination.169 The
court rejected ABC’s plea that it evaluate the “wisdom” of OFAC’s
distinction between tangible and intangible media, once again de-
ferring to the Executive’s broad discretion in deciding which actions
will best accomplish foreign policy objectives.170 Because it found
that neither the Berman Amendment’s text nor its legislative
history clearly addressed whether intangible media were included
in “informational materials,” and because it concluded that OFAC’s
decision to exclude intangible information was neither arbitrary,
161. Id. at 1012.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1012-13 (citing Teague v. Reg’l Comm’r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441, 446 (2d Cir.
1968)).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166. Capital Cities/ABC, 740 F. Supp. at 1013.
167. See id. at 1014.
168. Id. at 1013 (noting that print media companies were also prohibited from paying Cuba
for coverage rights, and that print and broadcast media retained equal opportunities to obtain
recordings of the event).
169. Id. at 1013-14.
170. Id. at 1014.
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capricious, nor constitutionally forbidden, the court deferred to
OFAC’s regulation of intangible media and denied ABC’s request for
relief.171
4. Emergency Coalition: The Effect of the Informational   
Amendments’ Prefatory Language
In Emergency Coalition to Defend Educational Travel v. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, the District Court for the District of
Columbia took on another case dealing with travel restrictions and
the Cuban embargo.172 As opposed to Walsh, however, this time the
court did not face a decision as to whether travel restrictions were
an indirect regulation of information. The court instead had to
decide whether the Informational Amendments’ introductory lang-
uage, which suggested a legislative desire to preclude regulation of
information-related travel, was sufficiently indicative of congressio-
nal intent so as to warrant a judicial override of OFAC’s regulation
of study abroad programs.173
In 2004, OFAC amended the CACRs to impose three new require-
ments on American study abroad programs in Cuba: (1) participat-
ing students must be enrolled in a degree-granting program with
the sponsoring American institution; (2) participating professors
must be full-time, permanent faculty with the sponsoring American
institution; and (3) the program must last at least ten weeks.174
OFAC adopted these requirements pursuant to a State Department
study that found students were abusing educational travel licenses
to engage in “disguised tourism.”175 The plaintiffs in Emergency
Coalition included a Johns Hopkins University professor who for
many years had facilitated two-to-three-week academic trips to
Cuba, as well as two Johns Hopkins students who planned on
participating in an upcoming trip to Cuba with that professor.176 
171. Id. at 1015. ABC later reached a confidential agreement with OFAC that permitted
the network to secure the broadcast rights it originally sought. See Milligan, supra note 43,
at 307.
172. 498 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (D.D.C. 2007).
173. Id. at 153-55.
174. See id. at 153-54 (citing 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560(a), 515.565 (2006)).
175. See id. at 154.
176. Id. at 154-55.
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Together, the plaintiffs argued that OFAC’s action would cause
them material injury because it would force Johns Hopkins to
terminate the Cuban travel programs.177 This time the court faced
not the interpretation of the Berman Amendment as in Walsh, but
rather the superseding FTIA.178 The plaintiffs claimed under
Chevron that OFAC had acted “in direct contravention of the intent
of Congress” by implementing a measure that was not only not
rationally related to the purpose of FTIA but was also arbitrary and
capricious.179 However, rather than framing OFAC’s travel restric-
tions as an indirect regulation of information as in Walsh,180 the
plaintiffs argued that Congress had clearly evinced its intent to
prohibit the regulation of educational travel in FTIA’s introductory
language: “It is the sense of the Congress that the President should
not restrict travel or exchanges for informational, educational,
religious, cultural, or humanitarian purposes ... between the United
States and any other country.”181 
The district court flatly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, noting
that courts regularly hold such introductory language to be “merely
precatory and non-binding.” Finding nothing in the “mandatory
provisions” of FTIA that prohibited travel regulations, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that OFAC’s
heightened educational travel restrictions thwarted a clear congres-
sional purpose for FTIA.182 If Congress had wanted to restrict the
President’s power to regulate travel, the court suggested, “it could
177. Id. at 155. The plaintiffs argued the programs would become “economically infeasible”
absent the enrollment of students from other institutions. Id. The court spent much of its
opinion deciding whether the plaintiffs had standing, ultimately determining that they did.
See id. at 155-61.
178. Id. at 164-65. By the time it reached the interpretation of FTIA, the court had already
rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims because the regulations were content neutral,
burdened academic speech only incidentally, and were supported by an important and
substantial government interest. See id. at 161-63. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ Fifth
Amendment “right to travel internationally” claim because the government had already
offered a substantial and important interest for the regulation. See id. at 155, 163-64.
179. Id. at 155, 164-65. Plaintiffs made a similar claim regarding the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7209 (2006). Emergency Coal., 498
F. Supp. 2d at 165-66.
180. The plaintiffs likely decided that Walsh preempted an indirect regulation theory. See
supra Part IV.B.1.
181. See Emergency Coal., 498 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (quoting Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994)).
182. Id.
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have done so explicitly” in the body of FTIA.183 Finding OFAC’s
reliance on the State Department’s study abroad report to be rea-
sonable, nonarbitrary, and noncapricious, the court deferred to
OFAC under Chevron.184 Although the plaintiffs apparently dropped
their FTIA claims on appeal, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless affirmed
the lower court’s conclusion that FTIA’s precatory statement of
congressional intent “is not law.”185
C. Analysis and Lessons for Social Media
The foregoing cases present a confusing and sometimes conflicting
set of precedents. The Walsh, Capital Cities/ABC, and Emergency
Coalition courts deferred to OFAC under Chevron because they
found that Congress had failed to clearly or directly address either
travel restrictions or the distinction between tangible and intangible
materials.186 Those decisions also found that OFAC’s regulatory
actions were not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.187 The
Cernuda court, on the other hand, refused to defer to OFAC under
Chevron because it found that the legislative history of the Informa-
tional Amendments exposed Congress’s clear purpose to exempt
from regulation all First Amendment-protected works.188 This sub-
section attempts to synthesize and reconcile these varied holdings.
1. Intangibility
To quickly dispose of one potential concern for social media,
Capital Cities/ABC’s deference to OFAC’s regulation of intangible
information is mooted by FTIA, which Congress almost assuredly
enacted in response to that opinion.189 FTIA broadened the scope of
exempted information to encompass all information “regardless of
format or medium of transmission,”190 which forced OFAC to amend
183. Id. at 165 n.9.
184. Id. at 165-66.
185. Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 14
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
186. See supra notes 128, 155-60, 181-85 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.3, and IV.B.4.
188. See supra Part IV.B.2.
189. See supra text accompanying note 63.
190. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (1994).
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its regulations and relinquish the regulatory control it had retained
over intangible materials.191 Thus, a company like Blabber need not
worry that its social media service will be subject to OFAC regula-
tions merely because the information it transmits is intangible in
nature.
2. Effect of First Amendment Protection
The strongest precedential support for the proposition that the
Informational Amendments prohibit OFAC from regulating a
service like Blabber is Cernuda’s conclusion that Congress intended
the Informational Amendments to reach all works protected by the
First Amendment.192 The Supreme Court has found there to be “no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied” to online speech as compared to other forms of
expression.193 Accordingly, any court following Cernuda’s reasoning
would undoubtedly find that social media information is protected
by the First Amendment and is therefore exempt from regulation.
In contrast to Cernuda, however, Capital Cities/ABC explicitly re-
jected the argument that Congress clearly intended to exempt all
First Amendment-protected information from regulation.194 These
divergent outcomes turn on the extent to which a court credits the
Informational Amendments’ legislative history.
3. The Relevance of Legislative History
One might argue that the discrepancy between the Cernuda and
Capital Cities/ABC cases is moot because, unlike the Berman
Amendment, the legislative history of FTIA explicitly states that
Congress intended the Informational Amendments to reach all First
Amendment-protected information.195 Yet when the Emergency
Coalition court examined FTIA, it not only failed to examine the
191. See 60 Fed. Reg. 39,255, 39,255-56 (Aug. 2, 1995) (amending the CACRs to comply
with FTIA).
192. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
193. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
194. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Amendment’s legislative history,196 but even found parts of FTIA’s
text to have no bearing on the interpretation of congressional in-
tent.197 The choice to examine only the Informational Amendments’
mandatory text—to the exclusion of supporting congressional
statements like prefatory language or legislative history—is a
critical one, for the analysis of Congress’s statutory intent is the
threshold inquiry that determines whether an agency like OFAC is
entitled to Chevron deference.198 Although FTIA’s clear affirmation
of the Informational Amendments’ First Amendment roots is a
positive development for a possible challenge to OFAC’s regulation
of social media, the Emergency Coalition court’s failure to give any
weight to the legislative history or prefatory language of the
Informational Amendments may well negate that benefit.
4. Effect on Indirect Regulation Theory
The Walsh and Emergency Coalition opinions are not necessarily
detrimental to the argument that OFAC’s regulation of information
creation services, like social media, constitutes an impermissible
indirect regulation of information.199 The courts in those cases found
that the Informational Amendments did not limit the President’s
authority to regulate travel in a sufficiently clear or direct manner
so as to defeat Chevron deference to OFAC.200 In contrast, FTIA’s
legislative history very clearly conveys Congress’s intent to immu-
nize “electronically transmitted information, transactions for which
must normally be entered into in advance of the information’s
creation.”201 Indeed, Congress was so confident in the clarity of its
intent to protect such incidental electronic transactions that it
explicitly declined to specifically refer to them in FTIA’s binding
text.202 A social media plaintiff could therefore persuasively argue
196. This may partly be due to the fact that the Emergency Coalition plaintiffs did not
invoke FTIA’s legislative history in their complaint. See Complaint ¶ 31, Emergency Coal. to
Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 498 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-
CV-01215), 2006 WL 2377876.
197. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part IV.A.
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See supra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.4.
201. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 239 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
398, 483.
202. See id.
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that FTIA embodies a clear congressional purpose to exempt not
only electronic information like that contained in social media but
also the transactions required to create that information. Again,
however, this strategy presumes that a court would examine and
credit the Informational Amendments’ legislative history—a con-
clusion that is not necessarily foregone.203 
5. Disparate Treatment Based on Medium
Even if a court declines to acknowledge legislative history as an
indication of clear congressional intent, a social media plaintiff
could still argue that OFAC’s regulation of social media as an
information creation service is arbitrary or capricious in light of the
Agency’s seemingly unjustifiable disparate treatment of print and
electronic publishers.204 The Cernuda court noted that it would have
found OFAC’s prohibition on importing Cuban paintings to be
arbitrary and capricious in light of the Agency’s authorization of
the importation of Cuban films;205 correspondingly, the Capital
Cities/ABC court found that OFAC’s regulation was not arbitrary
or capricious because OFAC was not denying television broadcasters
a benefit that it conferred to print publishers.206 Thus, even if
OFAC’s supposed justification for regulating social media services
were facially reasonable,207 the Agency’s arbitrary or discriminatory
application of the regulations would not be entitled to judicial
deference.
6. Relationship to the President’s Foreign Affairs Powers
One curious feature of these cases is their insistence that a broad
interpretation of the Informational Amendments would unduly
interfere with the separation of powers and the President’s foreign
affairs prerogative.208 This conclusion is misguided. The President’s
power to regulate international exports, imports, travel, and other
activities in the context of national emergencies or wartime is
203. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
205. See Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
206. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
207. See supra text accompanying note 98.
208. See supra notes 129, 166, 170 and accompanying text.
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explicitly granted to him by Congress through TWEA and IEEPA.209
The Informational Amendments represent an act by Congress to
withdraw power it had previously delegated to the President under
those acts.210 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the
Supreme Court recognized that Congress may constitutionally
delegate broad foreign affairs authority to the President without
imposing limitations that might otherwise be required in the
domestic setting.211 Indeed, the Second Circuit under Curtiss-Wright
found TWEA to be a constitutional delegation of legislative power.212
However, these decisions do not change the basic fact that TWEA
and IEEPA are permissive delegations.213 Simply because Congress,
in light of the executive’s constitutional primacy in foreign affairs,
may constitutionally grant the President broad foreign affairs
authority does not imply that it is unconstitutional for Congress to
later circumscribe that authority. Executive latitude under congres-
sionally delegated foreign affairs powers is constitutionally permit-
ted,214 not constitutionally required. 
Some have argued persuasively that Congress’s failure to clearly
address travel restrictions in the Informational Amendments con-
stitutes congressional acquiescence under Justice Jackson’s famous
tri-partite test for the legitimacy of executive power.215 However, it
would be difficult to sustain the same argument in the case of social
media. Congress has clearly expressed its intent to deregulate
electronic information and all transactions incident to the creation
of that information.216 Far from acquiescing to it, Congress has an-
209. See supra Part I.A.
210. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
211. 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
212. Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1966).
213. Accord Falk, supra note 37, at 180-81.
214. See supra text accompanying note 209.
215. See Milligan, supra note 43, at 298. Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer concurrence identified three “situations in which a President may doubt, or others
may challenge, his powers”: (1) when Congress affirmatively authorizes the exercise of power,
(2) when Congress acquiesces or shows indifference to the exercise of power, and (3) when
Congress formally disapproves of or revokes the power. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). Although executive activities in the first category enjoy the highest
presumption of validity and those in the third category take the President’s power to “its
lowest ebb,” those in the middle category exist in a “zone of twilight” in which congressional
inaction may “enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” Id.
at 637.
216. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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nounced that the President’s continued regulation of such informa-
tion and transactions is “incompatible with [its] expressed or
implied will”217 and is therefore invalid.218
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the foregoing analysis, a social media company like the
hypothetical Blabber faces three potential courses of action if it
wishes to make its service available in sanctioned countries. The
first option is for the company to simply maintain the status quo
and allow worldwide access to its service. The strongest support for
this course of action is the absence of any known enforcement of
export regulations by OFAC against Twitter, despite the company
making its services available worldwide; indeed, the U.S. govern-
ment has done nothing but praise Twitter and ask it to make itself
more available in embargoed countries, not less.219 On the other
hand, it is unclear whether other companies that have blocked
access to their services in certain countries are doing so in response
to quiet pressure from OFAC or merely acting conservatively and of
their own accord.220 The danger of a company like Blabber making
its service available worldwide, of course, is the potentially crippling
criminal liability if OFAC does enforce its regulations and a court
finds the company’s actions to be a willful violation of the regula-
tions.221 Although one could see the apparent lack of enforcement by
OFAC against Twitter and other companies as a positive sign, it
would be dangerous for a company to rely solely on OFAC’s his-
torical acquiescence as assurance that the Agency will not enforce
its regulations in the future.
A second option is for a social media company to request an
interpretative letter from OFAC that answers whether social media
services are exempt from regulation.222 The advantage to this ap-
proach is that it lends itself to a nonadversarial and perhaps even
collaborative dialogue with OFAC. Indeed, in one previous interpre-
217. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
218. This presumes that a court would even consider the Informational Amendments’
legislative history.
219. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 7, 9, 13 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 11.
222. See supra note 85.
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tative letter OFAC thanked academic publishers for their efforts “to
work ... in good faith” by personally meeting with the agency to
discuss and resolve ambiguities in the regulations.223 Unlike the
status quo approach, however, an interpretative letter request
brings the matter squarely to OFAC’s attention and forces the
Agency to clearly rule on it.
Given OFAC’s previous guidance on electronic information
services,224 it would not be surprising if the Agency concluded that
a social media service like Blabber falls outside the informational
exceptions. On the other hand, an interpretative letter request
might provide the social media company with an opportunity to
highlight the preferential treatment that OFAC appears to give to
print publishers.225 Moreover, forcing OFAC to contemplate the
prospect of issuing a negative interpretation for social media, and
thereby publicly declaring that furnishing access to American social
media in certain authoritarian countries—a practice so heartily
encouraged by the State Department226—is presumptively illegal,
might incentivize OFAC to amend its restrictions to more clearly
exempt social media services from regulation.
A final option is for a social media company to sue OFAC for
improperly administering the Informational Amendments. Unless
OFAC had already enforced its regulations against the company, the
lawsuit should mirror the procedural posture of Capital Cities/ABC:
a request for a declaratory judgment that (1) authorizes the com-
pany to provide access to its social media service in sanctioned
countries, (2) declares null and void OFAC’s regulations to the
extent that they regulate foreign access to social media services, and
(3) prohibits any proceeding by OFAC to prohibit such access.227
Using Chevron, the complaint should allege that the Informational
Amendments clearly express a congressional intent to exempt from
regulation all information that the First Amendment protects,
including online speech.228 The plaintiff company should further
assert that Congress clearly expressed a particular purpose to
immunize all transactions incidental to the creation of new elec-
223. See Letter of April 2, 2004, supra note 88, at 1.
224. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
226. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
227. Cf. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
228. See supra notes 61, 192 and accompanying text.
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tronic information.229 To that end, the complaint should dispute
OFAC’s exclusion of information creation services from its informa-
tional exceptions, at least as applied to social media, as an usurpa-
tion of congressional intent. The complaint should also allege that
regulating access to a social media service constitutes an impermis-
sible indirect regulation of pre-existing information.230
In response to the argument that such an interpretation of the
Informational Amendments impinges on the President’s foreign
affairs prerogatives, the social media plaintiff should urge that
although the President may constitutionally exercise broad, leg-
islatively delegated powers over foreign affairs, there is no clear
constitutional issue when Congress chooses to revoke aspects of that
delegated authority.231 Finally, the plaintiff company should argue
that even if the court finds Congress’s intent to be absent or
ambiguous, it should not defer to OFAC’s judgment. The plaintiff
should argue that the Agency’s regulations are arbitrary and capri-
cious insofar as they presumptively prohibit services through which
sanctioned users may publish electronic information but neverthe-
less permit services through which sanctioned users may publish
print information.232 
Of course, there are two events that would obviate a company’s
need to take any of these steps: Congress could enact a third
amendment to TWEA and IEEPA, or the President could direct
OFAC to amend its regulations. The likelihood of congressional
action is difficult to gauge. On one hand, there has been great public
enthusiasm for the role that American social media has played
during the Arab Spring;233 championing the liberalization of
restrictions on exporting social media might be politically favorable
for Congress. On the other hand, Congress simply may not deem the
issue sufficiently important to warrant spending political energy on
it, especially because the executive branch has issued licenses
229. See supra text accompanying note 64.
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
233. For example, the story crowning “the protester” as Time’s 2011 “Person of the Year”
praised social media as a “key tactical tool[ ]” that “turbocharge[d]” protesters’ efforts, and
noted that “[t]hroughout the Middle East and North Africa, new media and blogger are now
quasi-synonyms for protest and protester.” Kurt Andersen, The Protester, TIME (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373,00
.html.
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permitting the activity in several sanctioned countries, and because
there are no concrete examples of the regulations being actively
enforced for other countries. Capturing Congress’s attention would
likely require lobbying by the social media companies who presently
block their services either out of an abundance of caution or under
quiet pressure from OFAC. It is unclear whether companies would
be willing to spend their own political capital on this issue.
In a sense, the President has already directed OFAC to amend its
regulations through the Agency’s issuance of several country-
specific general licenses for Internet-based personal communica-
tions.234 Licensing is inadequate, however, for two reasons. First, as
EFF has noted, licensing is a slow and piecemeal process.235 Six
months of Syrian unrest elapsed before OFAC finally issued a
general license to export social media services to that country.236
Further, OFAC has issued social media licenses for Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria,237 yet restrictions remain for several other
countries, including Belarus, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, and Burma.238
Second, licensing depends entirely on whether OFAC decides to act.
Although a failure by OFAC to respond to a specific license request
could result in a court finding the Agency to have acted arbitrarily
or capriciously,239 OFAC may decide whether to issue a general
license entirely at its discretion.240 The government’s willingness to
issue country-by-country licenses for social media certainly deserves
praise. However, as this Note has sought to explain, these excep-
tions are ultimately not the Executive’s to make: the Informational
Amendments preclude the President from regulating social media
information in the first place.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. government is publicly committed to promoting so-called
“Internet freedom.”241 The State Department condemns the “numer-
234. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
236. See “Day of Rage” Protest Urged in Syria, MSNBC.COM NEWS (Feb. 3, 2011, 6:02 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41400687/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/.
237. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
238. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 537.210, 541.206, 548.206, 549.206 (2011).
239. See supra note 149.
240. See supra note 21.
241. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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ous governments [that] seek to deny the rights [that digital tech-
nologies] enable,” especially those “imposing laws that restrict
online discourse and access to information.”242 Beginning at least in
1988, Congress recognized that, through its economic sanctions
programs, the United States threatened to become such a regime
itself. The Informational Amendments “significantly promote the
foreign policy objectives of encouraging democracy and human
rights abroad, and improving understanding of and goodwill toward
the United States abroad.”243 Congress recognized that “private ini-
tiatives represent the lion's share of U.S. exchanges with the world,
and that private citizens engaged in private activity are frequently
the best purveyors of the values of American civilization.”244
The Berman Amendment’s namesake, Representative Howard L.
Berman, put it best: “The fact that we disapprove of the government
of a particular country ought not to inhibit our dialog with the
people who suffer under those governments.... We are strongest and
most influential when we embody the freedoms to which others
aspire.”245 Before the U.S. government can legitimately promote the
cause of Internet freedom in other countries, it must first ensure it
is not stifling that freedom itself. Only then will social media’s true
potential to catalyze widespread political change in authoritarian
countries be unlocked.246
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